Noncontradiction as a Scientific Modus Operandi :: Science Logic Papers

Noncontradiction as a Scientific Modus Operandi We explicate the view that our ignorance of the nature of the real world R, more so than a lack of ingenuity or sufficient time to have deduced the truth from what is so far known, accounts for the inadequacies of our theories of truth and systems of logic. Because of these inadecuacies, advocacy of substantial correctness of such theories and systems is certainly not right and should be replaced with a perspective of Explorationism which is the broadest possible investigation of potential theories and systems along with the realization that all such theories and systems are partial and tentative. For example, the position of classical logic is clearly untenable from the perspective of explorationism. Due to ignorance regarding R and, consequently, the partial and evidential nature of our knowledge about R, an explorationist foundational logical framework should contain machinery which goes beyond that of classical logic in the direction of allowing for the handling of confirmatory a nd refutatory evidential knowledge. Such a foundational framework (which I call Evidence Logic) is described and analysed in terms of its ability to tolerate substantial evidential conflict while not allowing contraditions. 0. Overview The variegated landscape of theories of truth and systems of logic, wherein each is cogently argued while yet inconclusive, is substantially accounted for by the fact that we just don’t know enough yet about the nature of our universe, let us call it R, to be able to settle on one or the other of these theories and systems as adequate for the representation and processing of our knowledge about R. In this paper firstly we discuss this thesis, that it is primarily our ignorance of R, and not any failure to rigorously construct our theories and systems, that is a fundamental cause of the inadequacies of these theories and systems. Secondly we will delineate a scientific perspective, Explorationism, which, if the thesis first considered is correct, is deserving of advocacy. Finally, we exemplify this perspective by exhibiting a logic, Evidence Logic (EL), which incorporates a broadened concept of negation which (1) provides for the representation and processing of both confirmato ry and refutatory evidential knowledge including the possibility of a generous range of conflicting evidence while yet (2) enforces noncontradiction. 1. The inadequacy of our theories of truth and systems of logic Any survey of the gamut of theories of truth so far constructed makes clear that, while each may be presented cogently, each manages to tell only part of the story.